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Abstract
One of the major problems of the U.S. health insurance market is that it leaves
individuals exposed to reclassication risk. Reclassication risk arises because the
health conditions of individuals evolve over time, while a typical health insurance
contract only lasts for one year. A change in the health status can lead to a
signicant change in the health insurance premium. We study how costly this
reclassication risk is for the welfare of consumers. More specically, we use a
general equilibrium model to quantify the implications of introducing guaranteed
renewable contracts into the economy calibrated to replicate the key features of the
health insurance system in the U.S. Guaranteed renewable contracts are private
insurance contracts that can provide protection against reclassication risk even in
the absence of consumer commitment or government intervention. We nd that the
welfare eects from introducing this type of contracts are small implying that the
presence of reclassication risk does not impose large welfare losses on consumers.
This happens because two institutions in the current U.S. system substitute for
the missing explicit contracts that insure reclassication risk: employer-sponsored
health insurance and government means-tested transfers. If these two institutional
features are removed, the average welfare gains from having access to guaranteed
renewable contracts are large and can exceed 2% of the annual consumption.
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1 Introduction
An important feature of the health insurance market is that a typical insurance policy
only lasts for one year while a disease can last for any period of time. This creates the
problem of reclassication risk - a risk to face a drastic increase in health premiums
when one's health status deteriorates. The fact that standard health insurance contracts
leave individuals exposed to reclassication risk is considered an important market failure
in the health insurance market (Hendel and Lizzeri, 2003; Diamond, 1992). Moreover,
the observation that sick people face high health insurance premiums was an impor-
tant argument for an additional regulation on health insurance market during 2009-2010
health reform debate.1 The goal of this paper is to evaluate how important is the lack of
protection against reclassication risk for the welfare of consumers.
One way to do this is to compare the current system with the rst best solution to
the problem of reclassication risk. The rst best is to enroll everyone into a long-term
health insurance contract. The price of such a contract depends on the average expected
medical expenses of all participants. In other words, healthy people make transfers to
the sick equalizing the insurance price for all risk categories. These contracts require
consumer's commitment because healthy individuals will tend to drop out. As shown
by Cochrane (1995), the lack of commitment can be overcome by introducing a special
arrangement such as illiquid accounts2. Another problem with ensuring participation
in these contracts is incomplete labor markets. Since premiums are based on average
medical expenses but not on individual income, consumers experiencing a sequence of
bad income shocks may be unable to pay the premium. This can be solved by introducing
income-based transfers. However, since all income redistributive measures have a non-
trivial eect on welfare, in the presence of these transfers it is hard to measure a pure
welfare eect of reclassication risk.
1This debate resulted in the major health reform bill that was signed in 2010. Among other things,
this bill forbids insurance companies to risk-adjust premiums in the individual market. This can be
considered as a regulatory way to remove reclassication risk. We discuss implications of our results for
the health reform in Section 7.
2More specically, Cochrane's idea is to substitute long-term contracts with a sequence of short-term
contracts that require consumers who turn out to be healthy to make transfers to insurance rms. Illiquid
accounts are needed to enforce these transfers.
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To overcome this problem, we consider a special type of contract that can provide in-
surance against reclassication risk but does not require consumers' commitment, income-
based transfers or any other special arrangements. These are guaranteed renewable con-
tracts discussed in details by Pauly et al (1995). These contracts are front-loaded: a
consumer is required to prepay part of his future premiums and this prepayment locks
him into the contract. In return, a consumer is guaranteed that i) he will be able to
renew his health insurance contract in the future; ii) the prespecied renewal price will
be independent of his future health realizations. A key feature of this contract is that
reclassication risk is insured not by making healthy people pay for the sick but by al-
lowing individuals to make state-contingent savings that pay o when their premiums
increase.3 To evaluate welfare costs of reclassication risk, we consider how much welfare
improvement can be achieved from introducing guaranteed renewable contracts in the
individual health insurance market.4
We construct a general equilibrium overlapping generations model where people face
uninsurable labor income risk and medical expense risk that can be partially insured.
Several types of health insurance are available. First, some individuals have access to
employer-based insurance. Second, lowest-income individuals can get Medicaid. Finally,
all individuals can buy insurance policy directly in the individual market. In the in-
dividual market premiums are risk-rated, i.e. depend on the current health conditions
of individuals. All policies last for one year while medical expenditures are persistent,
which creates the problem of reclassication risk.
Our model reects two institutional features that are important when evaluating the
importance of reclassication risk in the U.S. health insurance markets. First, a large
3It is important to point out the fundamental dierence between these guaranteed renewable contracts
and the regulatory guaranteed renewability provision that exists in some states of the US. The guaranteed
renewability provision forbids insurance companies to deny coverage to individuals who already have
an insurance contract and want to renew it. However, this provision does not require that the price at
renewal is xed at some prespecied level. In contrast, the key feature of guaranteed renewable contracts
is that they allow to predetermine the renewal price in advance.
4More specically, in order to measure welfare costs of reclassication risk we introduce a frictionless
market oering guaranteed renewable contracts. An alternative modeling strategy is to allow this market
to exist in the baseline economy but with frictions that prevent people from using it. Then we can
quantify how large are these frictions. Our results are robust to this alternative modeling strategy. In
Appendix D we show that relatively small xed costs are enough to deter people from buying guaranteed
renewable contracts, which possibly explain why we do not observe these contracts oered in reality.
3
fraction of non-elderly adults gets their insurance from employer-based market. This
market is community rated, i.e. premiums are independent of the health conditions
of individuals. People with permanent access to this market are protected from the
risk of premium uctuations. Also, lowest-income individuals can get public insurance
from Medicaid for free. Second, for people who face high medical shock and/or bad
labor income shock, the government provides protection in the form of the consumption
minimum oor. This consumption oor can also mitigate the consequences of the lack
of an explicit insurance against reclassication risk.
We calibrate the model using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey dataset to match
the key insurance statistics for the U.S. Using the calibrated model we study the quan-
titative implications of introducing frictionless guaranteed renewable contracts in the
individual market.
We nd that comparing to the situation when only standard short-term insurance
contracts are available, introduction of guaranteed renewable contracts can noticeably
decrease uninsurance rates - from 25.9% to 19.4% due to the higher participation in the
individual insurance market. Also, if both standard and guaranteed renewable contracts
are available, most of the consumers prefer to buy the later type of contract. Our results
show that people who hold guaranteed renewable contracts face almost no uctuations
in their health insurance premiums even if their health deteriorates. This implies that
these contracts provide a good protection against reclassication risk.
In terms of welfare, we nd that introduction of guaranteed renewable contracts brings
small welfare gains. This suggests that in the current U.S. health insurance system people
are not very concerned about the absence of an explicit insurance against reclassication
risk. This happens because two institutional features provide good implicit insurance
against reclassication risk. First, employer-sponsored health insurance that protects
mostly high-income people; and second, the consumption minimum oor that protects
mostly people with low income. If these two institutional features are removed, the
average welfare gains from having access to guaranteed renewable contracts are large
and can exceed 2% of the annual consumption. Our results are robust to the alternative
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design of guaranteed renewable contracts and the degree of actuarial unfairness in the
health insurance market.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section
3 illustrates how a guaranteed renewable contract works using a simple example. Section
4 presents the model. Section 5 explains our calibration. Section 6 discusses the results.
Section 7 considers implications of our results for the upcoming health insurance reform.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper belongs to two strands of literature. First is the literature studying how pri-
vate markets can provide insurance against reclassication risk if buyers cannot commit
to a contract. A seminal paper in this area is Cochrane (1995) who characterizes a set
of contracts that can provide long-term health insurance in such an environment. His
insight is to combine standard one-period insurance contracts with premium insurance,
i.e. insurance against future premium uctuations. One requirement for such premium
insurance to work is that each consumer needs to open a special account that works as a
clearing house between him and the insurance company. An important condition is that
consumers cannot freely withdraw money from this account. One special case in this set
of contracts that can work without a special account are front-loaded guaranteed renew-
able contracts. These contracts were studied in more details by Pauly et al (1995) who
showed that guaranteed renewable contracts can provide a good degree of reclassication
risk insurance without creating liquidity problem if consumers buy them while still young
and healthy. Front-loaded contracts were also studied by Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) for
the case of life insurance market. They showed that the structure of premiums in this
market is consistent with front-loaded contracts that emerge in the absence of consumer
commitment. However, Fang and Kung (2010) and Daily et al (2008) showed that the
growing life settlement market can limit the degree of reclassication risk insurance that
life insurers can provide. Finkelstein et al. (2005) studied front-loaded contracts in the
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long-term care insurance market and showed that the amount of front-loading currently
existing is not enough to lock consumers into the contracts. To our knowledge, our pa-
per is the rst one that studies welfare eects of guaranteed renewable contracts in the
health insurance market in a general equilibrium framework and taking into account the
existing institutions in the US.
The second strand of literature this paper belongs to studies quantitative heteroge-
neous agent models with incomplete markets augmented by (i) medical expense shocks
and (ii) health insurance markets where individuals can partially insure these shocks.
This branch of incomplete market literature has emerged recently and includes, among
others, papers by Kitao and Jeske (2009) who study subsidies for employer-based insur-
ance, Hansen et al (2012) who evaluate the consequences of expanding Medicare program,
Hsu (2009) who studies the eect of private health insurance on savings, and Pashchenko
and Porapakkarm (2013) who study the current health reform in the U.S. These studies
consider an environment when only one type of contract is available in the individual
health insurance market. Our contribution to this literature is that we expand the con-
tract space by allowing insurance rms to oer guaranteed renewable contracts. Since it
is a long-term contract, this extension involves solving a dynamic contracting problem
within a general equilibrium framework.
3 Simple illustration
This section constructs a simple example that illustrates how a guaranteed renewable
contract works. Consider an individual whose health is good, and the price he pays for
a standard one-period health insurance contract is pL. With probability v an individual
may still be in good health in the next period, in which case his health insurance premium
will stay unchanged. However, with probability 1  v his health status may deteriorate.
If this happens, his health insurance premium for the standard contract will raise to pH ,
where pH > pL. If an individual buys the standard one-period contract, he is exposed to
reclassication risk - the risk that his health premium will rise from pL to pH .
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Suppose an individual has an option to buy a guaranteed renewable contract at the
price pGR1 . This contract insures his medical expenditure in the next period like the
standard one-period contract. On top of that, it guarantees that in the next period an
individual can buy health insurance at the prespecied price pGR2 that does not depend
on his health status realization. If his health status remains the same he can buy a
standard contract at price pL. However, if his health status deteriorates he can renew
his guaranteed renewable contract at price pGR2 < pH . Under the assumption of perfect
competition in the insurance market, the price of such a guaranteed renewable contract
is determined in the following way:
pGR1 = pL + (1  v)(pH   pGR2 ): (1)
Note that the guaranteed renewable contract is more expensive than the regular one-
period contract because of the front-loading part (1  v)(pH   pGR2 ). This front-loading
takes into account the fact that an individual can become unhealthy but the price of
renewing his health insurance (pGR2 ) cannot be readjusted.
4 Model
4.1 Households
Demographics and preferences
The economy is populated by two overlapping generations: young and old. A young
individual stays young with probability y and becomes old with a probability 1   y.
An old individual survives to the next period with probability o.5 The population is
assumed to remain constant. Old agents who die are replaced by the entry of new young
5We assume a stochastic aging environment because a full life-cycle model is computationally imprac-
tical in our framework. The most time-consuming part of our computations is to nd equilibrium prices
of guaranteed renewable contracts. In a stochastic aging model this price depends only on health status.
In the full life-cycle model the price will be a function of both age and health which makes our model
computationally infeasible especially when it comes to transition calculations. In Section 5.3 we explain
how we adjust our calibration strategy to approximate for the key life-cycle features in our model.
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agents.
An individual discounts his future utility by the discount factor : Preferences are
described by the CRRA utility function with the risk aversion parameter :
u(c) =
c1 
1   :
Health insurance
An individual's health status h is indexed by f1; 2; ::; Hg. An increasing number implies
deteriorating health status. Health status evolves according to a H-state Markov process,
whereGy(h0jh) stands for the young andGo (h0jh) for the old. The current health status of
an individual determines his current medical expenditures x (h), where x is a deterministic
and strictly monotone-increasing function, dierent between the young and the old.6
Thus, in the following, we will refer to health status (h) and medical expenditures (x)
interchangeably.
Each young individual can buy insurance against medical expenditures in the indi-
vidual insurance market where two types of contracts are oered. The rst type is a
standard one-year contract that covers some fraction of the next period medical expen-
ditures. The price of this contract depends on the current health status of an individual
and is denoted by pI (h). The second type of contract is guaranteed renewable. This
contract covers a fraction of the next period's medical expenditures like a standard one-
year contract. In addition, a guaranteed renewable contract provides an option to renew
insurance in the following period at the same price regardless of the new health status7.
Guaranteed renewable contracts do not have a termination date, i.e. an individual can
renew the same contract as long as he is still young. An important condition for an indi-
vidual to be able to renew this contract is continuous participation. In other words, if an
individual does not renew the contract once, he will loose the option to renew it in the
6We represent medical expenses as exogenous shocks as opposed to an outcome of people's optimal
decision making. We discuss this assumption in details in Appendix B.
7There are several ways to design a guaranteed renewable contract by changing the price that an
insurer guarantees at the renewal. In our main experiments we assume that the renewal price is the
same as the price of the original contract. Later on we relax this assumption by letting the renewal price
to dier from the original price. Detailed discussion of these experiments is provided in section 6.
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future. The premium of a newly issued guaranteed renewable contract is a function of
the current health status of an individual. The price of a guaranteed renewable contract
that is already in force is xed and determined by the health status of an individual at
the time of the contract initiation.
In each period, with some probability, a young individual can get an oer to buy
employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). This is denoted by g: g = 1 if an individual
gets an ESHI oer, g = 0 if he does not.8 The out-of-pocket premium of employer-based
insurance is equal to
p = (1   ) p:
Here p is the premium charged to all participants of the employer-based pool, and  is
the fraction of this premium paid by the employer.
Low-income individuals are eligible to enroll in Medicaid that provides health insur-
ance for free. To become eligible for Medicaid, an individual's total resources net of
out-of-pocket medical expenses must be below a certain level which is denoted by ypub.
We use i to index the current health insurance status as follows:
i =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 2 ; if uninsured
 1 ; if insured by Mediciad
0 ; if holding a standard one-period insurance or ESHI
1; 2; :::; H ; if holding a guaranteed renewable contract originated when
his health status equals i.
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
If an individual holds a guaranteed renewable contract, i keeps track of the health status
when the contract was initiated. For a newly purchased contract i is the current health
status h. We denote the premium for a newly issued guaranteed renewable insurance as
pGR (h), and the premium for a guaranteed renewable contract that is already in force as
pGR (i) for i = f1; 2; :::; Hg.
8We incorporate an important feature of the data that many individuals do not have a permanent
access to ESHI but can lose this access several times over their working life. We do not explicitly model
COBRA which provides a possibility for some individuals to extend their access to the employer-based
pool for a limited time period after they lose their ESHI oer. Modeling COBRA requires us to add an
additional state variable making our computation of the transition impractical. In addition, COBRA
is not eective in eliminating the problem of fragmented access to ESHI and thus will not conceptually
change our model.
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If a young person is insured, the insurance will cover a fraction q (i; x) of his current
medical expenses. This fraction depends on his medical expenditures (x) and the type
of insurance he has (i).
All retired households are enrolled in Medicare. Medicare charges a premium of pmed.
We denote the fraction of medical expenses covered by Medicare by qmed (x).
Labor income
A young individual supplies labor inelastically. We denote his earnings by ewz, where ew
is the adjusted wage per eective labor unit and z is his idiosyncratic productivity. We
model the productivity, an ESHI oer, and health status as a joint Markov process. The
productivity of the old is set to zero.
Taxation and social transfers
Each households has to pay income tax T (y). The taxable income y is based on both
labor income and capital income. We incorporate two features of the current U.S. tax
code related to the taxation of health-related expenses into our denition of y. First,
households can tax-exempt their medical expenses in excess of 7:5% of their income. Sec-
ond, households buying group insurance can subtract the out-of-pocket group premium
p from their taxable income.
We also assume a social welfare system, T SI : The social welfare system guarantees that
a household will have a minimum consumption level at c. This reects the U.S. public
transfer programs such as Medically Needy part of Medicaid, food stamps, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), and transfers to nance uncompensated care.9
All old individuals are retired. They receive Social Security benets in the amount
ss.
9This structure reects an important feature of the US social insurance system - the coexistence of
ex-ante and ex-post insurance. Ex-ante insurance is represented in our model by Medicaid. Medicaid
enrolles get into the program based on their current total resources and this program covers their next
period's medical expenses. In contrast, ex-post insurance that is represented by the consumption oor
is available to individuals impoverished by their out-of-pocket medical costs this period.
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Optimization problem
Retired individuals The state variables of an old individual include liquid capital
(k 2 K =R+ [ f0g) and health status (h 2 H = f1; 2; :::; Hg). The value function of the
old can be written as follows:
Vo (k; h) = max
c;k0
u (c) + oEtV
o (k0; h0) (2)
s:t: k (1 + r) + ss+ T SI = c+ ok0 + x
 
1  qmed (x)+ pmed + T (y) (3)
where
T SI = max
 
0; c+ x
 
1  qmed (x)+ T (y) + pmed   ss  k (1 + r) (4)
y = max (0; ey) (5)ey = rk + ss max  0; x  1  qmed (x)  0:075(rk + ss) (6)
Equation (3) is the budget constraint. We assume that there is an actuarially-fair annuity
market. Thus each retired individual needs to save only ok0 instead of k010. Equation
(6) takes into account the tax-deductibility of medical expenses in excess of 7:5% of the
total income.11
Young individuals The state variables for a young individual include liquid capital
(k 2 K =R+ [ f0g), health status (h 2 H = f1; 2; :::; Hg), idiosyncratic labor productiv-
ity (z 2 Z =R+), ESHI oer status (g 2 G = f0; 1g), and index of health insurance status
(i 2 I = f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2; :::; Hg).
Each period an individual chooses his consumption (c), saving (k0), and health insur-
ance status for the next period
 
iH

. Depending on one's Medicaid eligibility, ESHI oer
and insurance status, he can choose not to buy any insurance (NB), buy a guaranteed
renewable contract (BGR), renew the existing guaranteed renewable contract (RGR) ;
buy a standard individual policy (BI), buy a group insurance (BG), or enroll in Medicaid
10Alternatively, one can assume that the accidental bequests are evenly distributed to all young. Since
the distributed amount is small, it will not aect our results. But the computational cost is higher since
one needs to wait until the convergence of total bequests to get the invariant distribution.
11The problem of a newly retired household is slightly dierent from a retired household since he is still
covered by his pre-retirement insurance. The dierence lies in the state variables and the out-of-pocket
medical expenditure. For the newly retired, the state variables are fk; h; ig; and in the budget constraint
x
 
1  qmed (x) is replaced by x (1  q (i; x)).
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(BM). We summarize the insurance choices as follows.
 If a household currently has a guaranteed renewable contract, i = f1; 2; 3; ::; Hg,12
iH =
fBGR;RGR;BI;BG;BMg if g = 1 and eligible for Medicaid
fBGR;RGR;BI;BMg if g = 0 and eligible for Medicaid
fNB;BGR;RGR;BI;BGg if g = 1 and not eligible for Medicaid
fNB;BGR;RGR;BIg if g = 0 and not eligible for Medicaid
 If a household does not have a guaranteed renewable contract, i = f 2; 1; 0g,
iH =
fBGR;BI;BG;BMg if g = 1 and eligible for Medicaid
fBGR;BI;BMg if g = 0 and eligible for Medicaid
fNB;BGR;BI;BGg if g = 1 and not eligible for Medicaid
fNB;BGR;BIg if g = 0 and not eligible for Medicaid
The value function of a working-age household can be written as follows:
Vy (k; h; z; g; i) = max
c;k0;iH
u (c) + yEVy (k0; h0; z0; g0; i0) + (1  y)EVo (k0; h0; i0) (7)
s:t: k (1 + r) + ewz + T SI = c+ k0 + x (1  q (i; x)) + P  h; i; iH+ T (y) (8)
where ew = ( w ; if g = 0
w   cE ; if g = 1
)
(9)
P
 
h; i; iH

=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 ; if iH = NB or BM
pI (h) ; if iH = BI
pGR (h) ; if iH = BGR
pGR (i) ; if iH = RGR
p ; if iH = BG
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(10)
y = max (0; ey) (11)
ey = ( ewz + rk  max (0; x (1  q (i; x))  0:075 ( ewz + rk)) ; if iH 6= BGewz + rk  max (0; x (1  q (i; x))  0:075 ( ewz + rk))  p ; if iH = BG
)
(12)
T SI = max (0; c+ x (1  q (i; x)) + T (y)  ewz   k (1 + r)) (13)
12Note, that if a household is eligible for Medicaid he cannot stay uninsured because Medicaid is free.
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i0 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 2 ; if iH = NB
 1 ; if iH = BM
0 ; if iH = fBI;BGg
i ; if iH = RGR
h ; if iH = BGR
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(14)
The conditional expectation on the right-hand side of equation (7) is over fh0; z0; g0g : The
second equation is the budget constraint. In equation (9), w is the wage per eective
labor unit. If a household has an ESHI oer, then the employer partly pays for the
premium. In order to break even, the employer deducts cE from the wage per eective
labor unit to get an adjusted wage ew. Equation (12) reects the tax deductibility of the
ESHI premium and medical expenses exceeding 7:5% of the income. Equation (14) maps
the current health insurance status and health insurance choices into the next period
health insurance status. The income eligibility of Medicaid program requires that
k (1 + r) + ewz   x (1  q (i; x))  ypub:
Distribution of households To simplify the notations, we denote the space of a
household' state variables by S: S  KHZGI for young individuals, S  KHI
for just-retired individuals, and S  K  H for retirees. Let s 2 S and denote by  y (s)
and  o (s) the measure of young and retired people correspondingly.
4.2 Production sector
There are two stand-in rms that act competitively. Their production functions are
Cobb-Douglas, AKL1 , where K and L are aggregate capital and aggregate labor and
A is the total factor productivity. The rst stand-in rm oers ESHI to its workers.
The second stand-in rm does not13. Under the competitive market assumption, the
second rm pays each employee his marginal product of labor. Because capital is freely
allocated between the two rms, the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the
13An alternative setup is that there are two islands, one oers ESHI and the other does not. Workers
are stochastically allocated between the two islands but there are no frictions in the capital market.
Inside each island, the labor market is competitive.
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capital-labor ratios of both rms are the same. Consequently we have14
r = AK 1L1    ; (15)
w = (1  )AKL  (16)
where  is the depreciation rate.
The rst rm has to partially nance health insurance premiums for its employees.
These costs are fully passed on to the employees through a wage reduction. In specifying
this wage reduction we follow Jeske and Kitao (2009). The rst rm subtracts an amount
of cE from the marginal product per eective labor. The total wage reduction of each
employee with an ESHI oer is cEz.
15 The zero prot condition implies
cE =
 p
 R
1fiH=BGg y (s)
R
1fg=1gz y (s)
: (17)
where 1fg is a function that is equal to one if its argument is true, otherwise the function
is equal to zero.
4.3 Private health insurance sector
We model the health insurance sector under the following assumptions. First, both
individual and group insurance markets are competitive implying zero expected prot for
each insurance contract. Second, there are administrative costs associated with issuing an
insurance policy and these costs are proportional to the total value of the contract. Third,
14Dene fK1; L1g and fK2; L2g as aggregate capital and labor in rms 1 and 2. Since capital can
move freely between rms, the Cobb-Douglas production implies r +  = A

K1
L1
 1
= A

K2
L2
 1
:
Next we can write
K
L
=
K1 +K2
L1 + L2
=
K1
L1
+ K2L2
L2
L1
1 + L2L1
=
K1
L1
:
The last equality uses the fact that K1L1 =
K2
L2
.
15The assumed structure implies a proportional transfer from high-income to low-income people inside
the employer-based pool. This assumption is not important for our results since all changes in our study
happen in the individual insurance market. An alternative assumption is a lump-sum wage reduction.
This alternative structure is dicult to implement in our setup since some workers will end up earning
zero or negative wage.
14
health insurance companies can observe only the current health status of an individual.16
Standard one-period insurance
The zero prot condition implies that the premium for a standard one-period insur-
ance contract is equal to the expected discounted medical costs covered by an insurance
company multiplied by administrative load
 
I

:
pI (h) = (1 + r) 1IEM (h) (18)
Here EM (h) is the expected medical expenses of an individual with health status h
covered by an insurance company:
EM (h) =
X
h0
x (h0) q (0; x (h0))Gy(h0jh)
Guaranteed renewable insurance
The price of a newly issued guaranteed renewable contract depends on the current health
status of an individual. To determine the premium, an insurer needs to assign a prob-
ability to an event that an individual will continue to renew the contract. Consider an
individual with health status ht who chooses to buy a new guaranteed renewable contract
in period t. Denote by t+j (ht+jjht) an insurer's belief that this individual will continue
to renew the same insurance contract every period up to a period t+ j when his health
status becomes ht+j. The zero prot condition allows us to write the premium of a new
guaranteed renewable contract as follows:
pGR (ht) = p
I (ht) +
1X
j=1
1
(1 + r)j
HX
ht+j=1
t+j (ht+jjht)
 
pI (ht+j)  pGR (ht)

(19)
16For standard one-period insurance contracts only health status matters for pricing. For guaranteed
renewable contracts an additional factor that aects pricing is the probability that the contract will be
renewed in the future. This probability depends not only on health, but also on other state variables, in
particular assets and labor income. We do not allow prices to be conditioned on assets or labor income
because these variables are dicult for insurance companies to verify.
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The rst term on the right hand side is the premium for a standard insurance contract
that covers medical expenses in the next period. The second term is the extra payment for
the option to renew the contract in the future. It arises because an insurance company will
not be able to readjust the price in the future even if an individual's health deteriorates.
The beliefs of the insurer t+j (ht+jjht) should be consistent with households' optimal
decisions in equilibrium. Denote the measure of young people with health status ht who
choose to buy a new guaranteed renewable contract in period t by  y

ht; i
H
t = BGR

.
Denote by F

ht+j; i
H
t+j = RGRjjht; iHt = BGR

the measure of those people in this group
who have been renewing the same contract every period from period t to period t + j
when their health become ht+j. Thus t+j (ht+jjht) can be dened as
t+j (ht+jjht) =
F

ht+j; i
H
t+j = RGRjjht; iHt = BGR

 y
 
ht; i
H
t = BGR
 (20)
Employer-based group insurance
The premium in the group insurance market does not depend on the health status of
individuals17. Using the zero prot condition, the premium can be written as a weighted
average of the expected covered medical costs of participating employees multiplied by
the administrative load
 
G

.
p = (1 + r) 1G
R
1fiH=BGg  EM (h)  y (s)R
1fiH=BGg y (s)
; (21)
4.4 Government constraint
We assume that the government runs a balanced budget. This implies:
Z
T (y)  y (s)+
Z
T (y)  o (s) =
Z  
ss+ xqmed (x)  pmed o (s)+Z T SI y (s)+Z T SI o (s)
(22)
17The U.S. regulation prohibits employers to charge employees with dierent health-related charac-
teristics dierent insurance premiums.
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The left-hand side is the total income tax. The rst term on the right-hand side is the
net expenditure on Social Security and Medicare systems for the old. The last two terms
are the costs of running the means-tested transfer program, i.e. to keep households above
the consumption minimum oor.
We dene the competitive equilibrium of the economy in Appendix A.
5 Data and Calibration
5.1 Data
We calibrated the model using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) dataset.
The MEPS collects detailed records on demographics, income, medical costs and in-
surance for a nationally representative sample of households. It consists of two-year
overlapping panels and covers the period of 1996-2006. We use eight waves of the MEPS,
from 1999 to 200718.
The MEPS links people into one household based on eligibility for coverage under
a typical family insurance plan. This Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU) dened
in the MEPS dataset corresponds to our denition of a household. All statistics we
use were computed for the head of the HIEU, i.e. we use individual-level data where
each individual is a head of a household. We dene the head as the person who has the
highest income in the HIEU. A dierent denition of the head (based on gender) does not
give signicantly dierent results. We use longitudinal weights provided in the MEPS to
compute all the statistics. Given that all individuals are observed for at most two years,
we pool together all eight waves of the MEPS. Since each wave is a representation of the
population in each year, the weight of each individual was divided by eight in the pooled
sample.
In our sample we include all non-student heads whose age is at least 20 and whose
labor income (to be dened later) is non-negative. The sample size for each wave is
18We do not use the rst two waves of the MEPS because they do not contain the variables we use
for constructing a household unit.
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presented in Table 1. We use 2003 as a base year. All level variables were normalized to
the base year using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
h Insert Table 1 here i
When measuring the insurance status in the data, we use the following approach. In
the MEPS the question about the source of insurance coverage is asked retrospectively
for each month of the year. We dene a person as having employer-based insurance if
he reports having ESHI for at least eight months during the year (variables PEGJA-
PEGDE). The same criteria was used when dening public insurance (variables PUBJA-
PUBDE) and individual insurance status (variables PRIJA-PRIDE)19. In addition, we
assume that a person has an ESHI oer if he reports having an oer in at least two out of
three interview rounds during a year (variables OFFER31x, OFFER42x, OFFER53x).
5.2 Demographics, preferences and technology
The period in the model is one year. Young agents are born at age 20 and stay young
on average 45 years, so the probability to stay young, y; is set to 44=45. The survival
probability of an old individual o is set to make the fraction of the old in the population
equal to 20%; thus 1  o = 4 (1  y) : To keep the total measure of population equal to
one, the measure of newborns in every period is set to
(1  y) (1  o)
2  y   o .
The risk aversion parameter  is equal to 3 which is in the range commonly used in
the macroeconomic literature. The discount factor  is calibrated to match the aggregate
capital output ratio of 3:0.
The Cobb-Douglas function parameter  is set to 0:33 which corresponds to the U.S.'s
capital income share. The annual depreciation rate  is calibrated to achieve the interest
19For those few individuals who switch the source of coverage during the year, we dene insurance
status in the following way. If a person has both ESHI and individual insurance in one year, and each
coverage lasted for less than eight months but with a total duration of coverage of more than eight
months, we classify this person as individually insured. Likewise, when a person has a combination of
individual and public coverage that altogether lasts for more than eight months, we dene that individual
as having public insurance. Our results do not change signicantly if we change the cuto point to 6 or
12 months.
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rate of 4:0% in the baseline economy. The total factor productivity A is normalized to
make the average labor income equal to one in the baseline model.
5.3 Joint process of health, labor income, and ESHI oer
Health status and Medical expenses
The medical expenses in our model correspond to the total amount paid for the health
care services (variable: TOTEXP). This includes both out-of-pocket payments and pay-
ments made by insurance companies but it does not include over-the-counter drugs. In
our model there is a one-to-one mapping between medical expenses and health status.
We categorize medical expenses into ve bins and each bin corresponds to a dierent
health status (Table 2).
h Insert Table 2 here i
The average amount of medical expenses corresponding to each health status are (
0.001,0.016,0.075, 0.318,1.483) for young households and (0.021,0.083,0.251,0.917,2.317)
for retired households. These numbers are based on the medical expenses in 2003/2004
wave normalized by the average labor income ($35; 624).
To construct a transition matrix for health status, we compute the fraction of house-
hold moving from one bin to another.20 The resulting transition matrix for young house-
holds, Gy (h0jh), is
0:619 0:264 0:092 0:022 0:002
0:261 0:432 0:260 0:044 0:003
0:094 0:257 0:517 0:122 0:010
0:070 0:142 0:414 0:341 0:034
0:013 0:096 0:274 0:372 0:245
,
20We assume that medical shocks follow a Markov process since MEPS allows us to observe only two
consecutive periods of medical expenses for each individual. The implied rst and second autocorrelation
of total medical expenses are 0.37 and 0.16. French and Jones (2004) provide a detailed examination of
health costs in Health and Retirement (HRS) dataset and report rst and second autocorrelation equal
to 0.45 and 0.34 correspondingly. It is important to point out that these numbers should be compared
with caution for the following reasons. First, French and Jones's estimates are based on out-of-pocket
medical expenses while ours - on total medical expenses. Second, HRS includes only people above age
50 while our estimates include young people and medical shocks for young people are less persistent.
Finally, data frequency for medical expenses in MEPS is one year while in HRS it is two years.
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while the transition matrix for retired households, Go (h0jh), is
0:626 0:225 0:111 0:037 0:001
0:257 0:416 0:265 0:058 0:005
0:131 0:324 0:427 0:108 0:011
0:090 0:170 0:455 0:242 0:043
0:056 0:174 0:388 0:336 0:046
.
Here the rst row corresponds to h = 1 and the rst column corresponds to h0 = 1.
Labor income
We dene labor income as a sum of wages (variable WAGEP) and 75% of income from
business (variable BUSNP). This denition is the same as used in the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics Dataset (PSID) that has been commonly used for income calibra-
tion in the macroeconomic literature. We categorized labor income into ve quintiles
(5 20%). The labor income level in each quintile is based on the value for 2003/2004
wave normalized by the average income. These numbers are 0:091, 0:477, 0:802, 1:226,
and 2:417.
The dashed lines in Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 1 show the relationship between labor
income and medical expenses/health observed in the data. The hump shape in Panel (a)
can be explained by the life-cycle prole of labor income. Our model does not have age
dimension so the age prole of labor income is partially captured by health status. In
the data households in good health (h = 1) are more likely to be young, while those in
bad health (h = 4 or h = 5) are more likely to be near retirement. These two groups
tend to have lower incomes than the middle-age households.
Panel (b) also shows that the average medical expenses of households in the rst
income quintile are two times higher than the average medical expenses of the high
income group. This pattern is driven by two facts. First, the distribution of medical
expenses is highly skewed: the medical expenses of people with h = 5 is more than four
times higher than the medical expenses of those with h = 4. Second, households with
serious health problems, h = 5; are more likely to experience a very low income shock.
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When constructing a joint Markov process of labor income and health status, our
goal is to capture the above pattern. To do this we divide our sample into four sub-
samples based on the health status in the second year of each wave. The rst, second,
and third subsamples include households whose health status in the second year equals
1, 2, and 3 respectively. The forth subsample include households whose health sta-
tus in the second year equals 4 or 5. Then we construct a transition matrix of labor
income for each subsample by calculating the fraction of households who move from
one quintile to another. The resulting four transition matrixes capture the dynamics
of labor income conditional on health shock in the second period, and are denoted as
Q (z0jz; h0 = 1) ; Q (z0jz; h0 = 2) ; Q (z0jz; h0 = 3) ; and Q (z0jz; h0 = 4) : Due to the small
sample size, we cannot get the transition matrix conditional on h0 = 5 directly. So we
dene
Q (z0jz; h0 = 5) = aQ (z0jz; h0 = 4) + (1  a)D; 0  a  1;
where D is a 5 5 matrix with the rst column equal to one and the remaining columns
equal to zero. If a = 1, Q (z0jz; h0 = 5) = Q (z0jz; h0 = 4) : But if a = 0; Q (z0jz; h0 = 5) =
D, meaning that the income of those households who have serious health problems drops
to the level of the lowest income quintile. In our calibration, we choose a to make the
average labor income of those with h = 5 match the data as shown in Panel (a) of Figure
1.
The joint transition matrix of health status and labor income is constructed by com-
bining the transition matrix of health status, Gy (h0jh), with the conditional transition
matrix of labor income Q (z0jz; h0). The advantage of this approach is that the conditional
expected medical expenses depend only on the current health status. This dramatically
simplies the computation since we can compute the premiums of standard one-period
insurance directly from Gy (h0jh)21.
21If the conditional expected medical expense also depend on the current labor income, say
E (x0jx; z = 1) 6= E (x0jx; z = 2) ; and the insurance company does not observe z; then the premiums
of standard one-period contracts will depend on households' insurance decision and the equilibrium
distribution of households.
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ESHI Oer status
The dashed line in Panel (d) in Figure 1 shows that there is a strong correlation between
the probability to get access to ESHI and labor income. We assume that the probability
of getting an ESHI oer is a logistic function:
Probt =
exp(ut)
1 + exp(ut)
;
where the variable ut is an odds ratio that takes the following form:
ut = 0 + 1Dgt 1 + hDht + zDzt + yearDyear; (23)
where Dgt 1 is a dummy variable for an ESHI oer in period t  1, Dht and Dzt are the
sets of dummy variables for health status and income quintile in period t, and Dyear is a
set of dummy variables for each year.
To calibrate the joint distribution fh; z; gg of newborns, we use the empirical joint
distribution of households aged 20-35 from the data. This allows us to approximate the
life-cycle features absent from our model. In particular, an important characteristic of a
life-cycle model is an increasing age prole of medical expenses and labor income. In our
calibration newborns are clustered around relatively low medical expenses and relatively
low labor productivity. Given the persistence of the processes for medical shocks and
productivity, young people in our model are slowly moving up the medical expenses and
labor income ladders. The average medical expense as a fraction of average labor income
in our model is 7.1% for young people and 20.0% for old people, comparing to 7.3% and
20.4% in MEPS. For newborns, the fraction of average medical expense in average labor
income constitutes 4.6% comparing to 5.2% for people aged 20-35 in MEPS.
Figure 1 allows to compare our simulations of fh; z; gg with the data (simulations are
plotted with the solid lines). Overall, we are able to match the key features of the data
well. However, the simulated oer rate (59:1%) is slightly lower than in the data (64%)22.
22This mismatch mostly arises from the absence of educational heterogeneity in our model. As shown
in Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2011), people with low educational attainment have a signicantly
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5.4 Insurance policies
We use the MEPS to nd the fraction of medical costs covered by an average insurance
policy. We estimate the following equation
InsCov = 0 + 1x+ 2x
2 +Dyear
separately for private insurance, Medicaid, and Medicare. InsCov is medical expenses
paid by insurance (variables: TOTPRV,TOTMCD,TOTMCR). We include only people
with positive medical expenses when estimating this regression. Then we use our esti-
mates to compute the fraction of medical expenses covered by insurance for each health
status and truncate it to be between 0 and 1. Table 3 reports the results for each type
of insurance.
h Insert Table 3 here i
5.5 Government constraint
In calibrating the tax function T (y) we use a nonlinear relationship specied and esti-
mated by Gouveia and Strauss (1994):
T (y) = a0

y   (y a1 + a2) 1=a1

Here a0 controls the marginal tax rate levied on people with the highest income, a1
determines the progressivity of the tax code, and a2 is a scaling parameter. We set a0 and
a1 to the original estimates of Gouveia and Strauss (0:258 and 0:768 correspondingly).
The parameter a2 is used to balance the government budget.
The consumption minimum oor c in the baseline economy was calibrated so that the
fraction of households with assets less than $5; 000 in the model is the same as in the
data. Based on the 1989-2001 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) dataset this fraction is
lower probability to get access to ESHI.
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20.0% (Kennickell, 2003). To match this fraction, c is set to 0.92 of the Federal Poverty
Line (FPL), or $8; 807.
The Social Security replacement rate is set to 45% of the average labor income. This
number is obtained by applying the Social Security benet formula to the average labor
earnings prole.
5.6 Medicaid and private insurance
The Medicaid eligibility rules dier from state to state. As of 2009, 14 states had an
income eligibility threshold below 50% of FPL, 20 states had it between 50% and 99% of
FPL, and 17 states had it higher than 100% of FPL (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008).
We set ypub to 48.0% of FPL, or $4; 595, to match the fraction of people insured by
Medicaid.
In our baseline model, we assume that only standard one-year contracts are oered
in the individual market. To match the fraction of those buying individual insurance, we
set the administrative load of an individual insurance policy I to 1:208.
The administrative load for the group insurance G is set to 1:11 (Kahn et al, 2005).
We set the share of health insurance premium paid by the rm ( ) to 83:0%. This
number is consistent with the data in which the premiums of group insurance paid by
employers range from 77% to 89% (Sommers; 2002).
5.7 Performance of the baseline model
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the parameters used in our baseline model. Table 6 reports the
fraction of non-elderly adults with dierent insurance statuses and the numerical results
from the baseline model. The model slightly underestimates the fraction of people with
ESHI because our calibrated oer rate is lower than that in the data. As a result the
fraction of uninsured is slightly overestimated.
h Insert Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 here i
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To evaluate the performance of our baseline model, we use health insurance statistics
not targeted by our calibration. Figures 2 and 3 show the decomposition of health
insurance status along the dimension of labor income and health status. Our model
is able to replicate the insurance statistics for people in dierent income and health
categories.
h Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here i
6 Results and discussions
This section discusses how the baseline economy changes once guaranteed renewable
contracts are introduced. We provide analysis based on the open economy case, i.e. we
x the interest rate and the wage but allow all insurance prices to adjust in equilibrium23.
6.1 Eects on premiums
Figure 4 compares the premium for a newly issued guaranteed renewable contract with
that for a standard one in the new steady state. Guaranteed renewable contracts are
more expensive due to the extra payment for the renewability. The dierence in prices
between the two types of contracts declines as health status deteriorates. For example,
for the healthiest group the premium for a guaranteed renewable contract is almost three
times higher than that for a standard contract. On the other extreme, for people in
the worst health status, the premiums for guaranteed renewable and standard insurance
are the same. For this group of people health status cannot deteriorate any further,
so the price of a guaranteed renewable contract does not include the extra payment for
renewability.
To understand how well guaranteed renewable contracts provide protection against
reclassication risk, Figure 5 compares premiums for standard contracts with the average
23We do this to isolate the pure eect of providing insurance against reclassication risk from the eect
of change in aggregate capital. For the closed economy case, the aggregate capital slightly decreases by
0.4%.
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premiums for guaranteed renewable contracts including those that are already in force
for at least one period. An important observation is that on average people who hold
guaranteed renewable contracts face insurance premiums that are almost independent
of their health status. This happens because most people initiate guaranteed renewable
contracts when they are healthy and later they face low premiums even if their health
becomes worse. In contrast, people who buy standard contracts face a steep increase
in their premiums once their health status deteriorates. This implies that guaranteed
renewable contract is a good means to eliminate the risk of premium uctuations.
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6.2 Eects on health insurance decisions
Table 7 shows how households' insurance purchasing decisions change after guaranteed
renewable contracts are introduced. The fraction of uninsured in the new steady state
noticeably decreases from 25.4% to 19.4%. The fraction of people with individual in-
surance increases from 8.2% to 14.2%, and most of this people (9.8%) hold guaranteed
renewable contracts.
h Insert Table 7 here i
Table 8 shows how people move between dierent insurance statuses once guaranteed
renewable contracts are available24. Around 19% of previously uninsured people start
buying insurance once there is the option of guaranteed renewability. This suggests that
guaranteed renewability makes the individual insurance market more attractive. Indeed,
around 45% of people who were previously buying standard contracts switch to use
guaranteed renewable ones.
h Insert Table 8 here i
24This table is constructed for the rst period of transition to the new steady-state once guaranteed
renewable contracts are available.
26
Figures 6 and 7 show the decomposition of health insurance decisions by income
quintile and health status. Figure 6 shows that once guaranteed renewable contracts
become available, the participation in the individual market increases for people both
in good and bad health meaning that the risk-sharing increases. More specically, the
percentage of uninsured among people in the worst health status decreases from 12.7%
to 9.3%, while for people in the best health status this number goes down from 24.3%
to 22.4%. This can be explained by the fact that individuals buy guaranteed renewable
insurance when they are still in good health and therefore are able to renew it at a
relatively low premium once their health deteriorates. Table 9 illustrates this point
further by showing that people buying guaranteed renewable contracts tend to have
higher expected medical expenses than those buying standard contracts.
h Insert Figure 6, Figure 7 and Table 9 here i
Figure 7 shows that guaranteed renewable contracts crowd out standard contracts
and reduce the fraction of uninsured individuals for all income quintiles. Interestingly,
people in the two lowest income quintiles show the largest participation in the market
for guaranteed renewable contracts. Table 9 shows that on average individuals buying
guaranteed renewable contracts have lower income than those buying standard contracts.
This seems surprising at rst given that guaranteed renewable contracts are more expen-
sive than standard ones. To investigate this issue further, Figure 8 plots the fraction of
people buying guaranteed renewable contracts in each asset and income quintiles. One
can see that the negative correlation between income and demand for guaranteed renew-
able contracts comes from the top two asset quintiles. In other words, individuals who
buy guaranteed renewable contracts have accumulated enough assets to aord this type
of contract but their income is low. These individuals are less likely to get access to
ESHI, and as will be shown later, this is an important factor determining the demand
for guaranteed renewable contracts.
h Insert Figure 8 here i
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6.3 Welfare analysis
The rst row of Table 10 illustrates the welfare gains when moving to an economy where
guaranteed renewable contracts are available. Despite the fact that guaranteed renewable
contracts provide good protection against reclassication risk, the resulting welfare gains
are small. A newborn in the new economy needs a compensation equivalent to 0.0170%
of his annual consumption if he is to live in the baseline economy. If we take transition
periods into account, the average welfare gains among all young slightly increase to
0.0696%.
h Insert Table 10 here i
Figure 9 shows that the consumption equivalent variation in the rst period where
guaranteed renewable contracts become available diers substantially by income and asset
quintiles. People with low income but high assets are the ones who value guaranteed
renewable contracts most. This is the same group that have the highest demand for
guaranteed renewable insurance as shown in Figure 8.
h Insert Figure 9 here i
The small welfare gains from having an explicit insurance against reclassication
risk imply that the eect of reclassication risk on consumption smoothing is not large.
To investigate why this is the case, we consider several factors which may aect how
much individuals are concerned about reclassication risk and how much they value
the new insurance contracts. In particular, we consider the following ve factors: i)
implicit insurance against reclassication risk provided by ESHI and Medicaid, ii) the
consumption minimum oor, iii) dierent degree of front-loading, v) labor income risk,
and vi) actuarial unfairness of premiums. The rst two factors aect how well individuals
are protected against reclassication risk in the baseline economy. The last three factors
aect individuals' valuation of guaranteed renewable contracts as a means to provide
reclassication risk insurance.
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In all experiments, when computing welfare gains for all young we control for the
distribution of the households. In general, the distribution of households can change
signicantly from one experiment to the other. To make sure our comparisons are valid,
we always compute the average welfare gains for all young using the same distribution.
More specically, in all experiments we use the steady-state distribution of the baseline
economy as an initial distribution of the transition period.
ESHI and Medicaid
In the baseline economy there are two institutions that can provide an implicit insur-
ance against reclassication risk. These institutions are Medicaid and employer-based
insurance. Both Medicaid and ESHI provide health insurance at a risk-independent rate.
Medicaid is free, and premiums for ESHI are community rated, i.e. they are the same
for all participants in the employer-based pool. Thus, an agent with a high probability
of getting access to these insurance schemes is less concerned about the risk that his
premium will increase when his health deteriorates.
To understand how quantitatively important these eects are, we consider several
counterfactual experiments. We remove ESHI, Medicaid or both of these programs from
the baseline economy, and then reevaluate the welfare gains from introducing guaranteed
renewable contracts. The results are presented in the third to fth rows of Table 10. The
corresponding changes in the individuals' insurance decisions are shown in the second
and third rows of Table 11.
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The welfare eects from introducing guaranteed renewable contracts do not change
much once Medicaid is removed: the consumption equivalent variation goes up from
0.0696% to 0.0715%. People who rely on Medicaid are low-income people who cannot
aord health insurance on their own. As observed from the second row of Table 11, most
of the publicly insured people become uninsured once Medicaid is removed. So they
are indierent between having access to guaranteed renewable contracts or not. This
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happens because people are exposed to reclassication risk when they buy insurance
contracts that deviate from the rst best. For people who never buy private insurance
contracts, these deviations from the rst best do not matter.
The situation is very dierent when ESHI is removed. As can be seen in the third row
of Table 10, the removal of ESHI increases the consumption equivalent variation almost
three times, from 0.0696% to 0.1774%. This implies that without ESHI individuals are
more exposed to reclassication risk, thus guaranteed renewable contracts become more
valuable.
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate this point further. The elimination of Medicaid has almost
no eect on the demand for guaranteed renewable insurance for people in all income and
asset quintiles. In contrast, if there is no ESHI, the take-up rates of guaranteed renewable
insurance increase dramatically. The most noticeable changes are observed among high-
income people in the top two asset quintiles. Previously this group had a very low demand
for guaranteed renewable contracts. Once ESHI is removed, the majority of this group
start buying new contracts. As a result, the negative relationship between the take-up
rates of guaranteed renewable contracts and income observed in Figure 8 disappears.
Figure 11 shows how welfare eects from the new contracts dier by income and asset
quintiles in the environment when either Mediciad or ESHI is not available. People who
gain the most from having an explicit insurance against reclassication risk in the absence
of ESHI are those in the high-income group. In the baseline economy most of these people
have access to community rated insurance through their employers. For them ESHI is a
good source of reclassication risk insurance. Once this institutional feature is removed,
high-income people place much higher value on having access to guaranteed renewable
contracts.
h Insert Figure 10 and Figure 11 here i
Minimum consumption oor
A major problem with reclassication risk is that it decreases the insurability of health
shocks. If premiums increase following a deterioration of the health status, insurance
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may become unaordable. Thus, people are more concerned about reclassication risk if
it is very painful to be uninsured.
The consumption minimum oor provides support for people who depleted all re-
sources. This includes uninsured people with high medical costs. Thus, the consumption
oor mitigates the consequences of being uninsured and decreases the concern of lacking
protection against reclassication risk.
To understand the quantitative signicance of this eect, we reevaluate the welfare
gains from guaranteed renewable contracts in an economy with a reduced consumption
minimum oor. The seventh to tenth rows of Table 10 show the welfare eects when the
consumption minimum oor is equal to 75%, 50%, 25% and 10% of its level in the baseline
model. The resulting changes in welfare gains are substantial. When the consumption
oor decreases to 10% of the baseline level, the average consumption equivalent variation
increases more than 30 times - from 0.0696% to 2.3293%.
To illustrate the role of the minimum consumption oor in more details, Figures 12
and 13 show how the demand for guaranteed renewable contracts and welfare gains change
in response to a decline in the consumption oor for people with dierent income and asset
levels. In terms of the demand for new insurance contracts, most noticeable changes are
observed among people in the bottom two asset quintiles. When the consumption oor is
reduced to 25% of the baseline level, a lot of people in this group start buying guaranteed
renewable contracts while previously their participation in this market was almost zero
(Figure 8). We do not see a similar response from the high-asset group because these
people buy guaranteed renewable contracts even when the consumption oor is high.
Those high-asset individuals who do not buy guaranteed renewable contracts are insured
by ESHI and a change in the consumption oor does not aect their insurance decisions.
In terms of welfare, the consumption equivalent variation increases substantially for
all people except those in the very bottom of both income and asset distribution. The
later group has no resources and always qualies even for the least generous means-tested
transfers. It is important to note that even people with high assets value guaranteed re-
newable contracts substantially more once the consumption minimum oor decreases.
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This happens because these people may also face unaordable health insurance premi-
ums after a sequence of bad health shocks. Since there is less chance they can rely on
the consumption oor in this situation, they value an explicit insurance against unaord-
ability of premiums more25.
h Insert Figure 12 and Figure 13 here i
Dierent degree of front-loading
The welfare gains from the availability of an explicit insurance against reclassication risk
may also be aected by the design of this insurance. Guaranteed renewable contracts
are front-loaded and it may be the case that the amount of front-loading is in sharp
contrast with what would be optimal from the point of view of intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing. In general, if guaranteed renewable contracts are more front-loaded they
provide more reclassication risk insurance because they lock more consumers into the
contract, thus having better risk composition as time goes by. This comes at the cost of
being more expensive and also being further away from the optimal intertemporal allo-
cation of resources. In other words, there is a tradeo between better insurance against
reclassication risk and better intertemporal allocation. This tradeo may become worse
in the environment with uninsurable labor income risks. In such an environment con-
sumers want to keep a buer stock of savings against negative labor income shock and
thus may be less interested in front-loaded contracts that require prepayments for risks
that will be realized far into the future.
To understand whether the tradeo between optimal consumption smoothing and re-
classication risk insurance plays an important role in consumers' valuation of guaranteed
renewable contracts, we consider two experiments. We reduce the degree of front-loading
by increasing the price that renewable contracts guarantee, rst, to 125% and then to
180% of the original price26. In other words, if previously an individual is guaranteed to
25This result is consistent with the ndings of De Nardi et al. (2010) who showed that social insurance
has a large eect even on people at the top end of income distribution.
26Using example from Section 2, this is equivalent to setting pGR2 = 1:25  pGR1 and pGR2 = 1:8  pGR1 .
In all the previous experiments we have pGR2 = p
GR
1 .
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be able to buy health insurance at the unchanged price, now he is guaranteed the price
will not increase more than 25% or 80% of the original price.
Table 10 shows that lowering the degree of front-loading makes welfare gains smaller:
the consumption equivalent variation decreases to 0.0645% and 0.0622% for the case
of 125% and 180% contracts correspondingly. This suggests that design of guaranteed
renewable contracts does not aect our evaluation of welfare costs of reclassication risk.
Labor income risk
Another factor that can aect how much people value guaranteed renewable contracts
is labor income risk. Uninsurable and persistent labor income shocks can aect both
people's attitude towards reclassication risk and their ability to participate in long-term
insurance contracts.
Labor income risks can make it harder to participate in long-term insurance contracts.
Guaranteed renewable contracts require periodic payments to stay in force. Individuals
who experience a bad income shock may nd their next payment unaordable and thus
have to terminate the contract. On the other hand, labor income risks make people more
concerned about being uninsured because if a medical shock coincides with a negative
labor income shock it will make their situation worse.
To understand whether labor income shocks signicantly aect people's valuation of
insurance against reclassication risk, we conduct an experiment where we reduce labor
income risk. Specically, in this experiment we change the labor income distribution
in such a way that the cross-sectional variance of labor income is equal to 15% of the
baseline case 27. As shown in Table 10, the welfare gain from having a protection against
reclassication risks is still small; more specically the consumption equivalence drops
from 0:0696% to 0:0244%. Table 11 shows that less people buy guaranteed renewable
contracts when facing lower labor income risks: the fraction of people with new contracts
27Technically, we keep the joint transition matrix of health, labor income, and ESHI oer the same
as in the baseline model but assign a new labor income for each income grid. Denote zj and bzj as the
original and new value for each income grid j. We dene bzj = 0:15zj + 0:75z, where z is the cross-
sectional average labor income in the baseline model. Since the invariant distribution over each income
grid is the same, it is easy to show that the cross-sectional average of bz is z, while its cross-sectional
variance is 15% of that in the baseline case.
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goes down from 9.8% to 6.7%. This suggests that labor income risk does not prevent peo-
ple from buying guaranteed renewable contracts, on the contrary it makes the additional
insurance more valuable.28
Actuarial unfairness of premiums
Finally, we consider whether actuarial unfairness plays an important role in the valuation
of guaranteed renewable contracts. Even if reclassication risk is costly in terms of
welfare, people may not value insurance against this risk if it is actuarially unfair. We
consider the case when administrative loads are entirely eliminated from both standard
and guaranteed-renewable contracts29. The results of this experiment are presented in
the last column of Table 10. The welfare gains change very little, going up from 0.0696%
to 0.0905%, suggesting that actuarial unfairness does not signicantly aect people's
valuation of guaranteed renewable contracts.
7 Implication for the health insurance reform
In March of 2010 President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Aordable Care
Act that is going to introduce signicant changes in the U.S. health insurance system.
This reform has two key components. First, it introduces a wide range of income-based
transfers, i.e. subsidies and expansion of public coverage. Second, it changes the rules
under which the individual insurance market operates. In particular, the new law does
not allow insurance companies to dierentiate premiums by individual's health status.
In other words, it introduces community rating in the individual insurance market. To
prevent cream-skimming behavior of insurers, the reform also prohibits insurance com-
panies to deny coverage to anyone. Finally, the new law mandates individuals to buy
health insurance unless their income is very low.
Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013) evaluate how dierent components of the reform
28As discussed in De Santis (2007), the welfare function is convex in the overall consumption risk.
Labor income shocks augment overall risk; thus removing the labor income risk makes the welfare cost
of any additional uncertainty smaller.
29In other words, we set I = G = 0.
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contribute to its welfare outcome and nd that the contribution of community rating
is very small. This paper conrms their results and provides an insight for why this
is the case. Community rating is a regulatory approach to eliminate reclassication
risk30. In this paper we show that this risk is already to a large extent insured by
such institutions as employer-based insurance and means-tested transfers. Thus, the
introduction of community rating have a small eect on welfare.
Another implication of our ndings is that even if reclassication risk is important
for welfare, good protection against it can be obtained through private markets. Com-
munity rating accompanied by individual mandates is a large scale intervention in the
insurance market. As such it has non-trivial distorting eects on both households' and
insurance rms' decisions. In this light a private market approach to solving the problem
of reclassication risk may be an alternative worth considering.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies how important reclassication risk is for the welfare of consumers.
Reclassication risk is believed to be an important problem in the individual health
insurance market. Premiums in this market are risk-rated while a typical contract lasts
for only one year. Individuals whose health status deteriorates can see a drastic increase in
their health insurance premiums, and this reduces their ability to obtain health insurance.
We constructed a general equilibrium model and calibrated it using the MEPS dataset
to replicate the key features of the U.S. economy. To evaluate welfare costs of reclassi-
cation risk, we consider the eect of introducing into this economy guaranteed renewable
health insurance contracts. Guaranteed renewable contracts are private insurance con-
tracts that provide protection against reclassication risk without requiring consumer's
commitment or income based transfers.
We nd that the welfare gains from having access to the explicit insurance against re-
classication risk through guaranteed renewable contracts are small. This is because two
30Kifman (2002) provides a detailed comparison between guaranteed renewable contracts and commu-
nity rating as a means to insure reclassication risk.
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institutional features of the current system - employer-based insurance and consump-
tion minimum oor - provide a good implicit protection against reclassication risk.
While employer-sponsored insurance mostly provides insurance to high-income people,
low-income people are protected by the consumption minimum oor. If these two insti-
tutions are removed, welfare gains from having access to guaranteed renewable contracts
are large and can exceed 2% of the annual consumption. Our results are robust to the al-
ternative design of guaranteed renewable contracts and the degree of actuarial unfairness
in the health insurance market.
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Panel 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 Total
Obs. 4,954 4,017 8,248 6,244 6,464 6,417 6,200 6,656 49,200
Table 1: Number of observations in eight waves of MEPS (1999-2007)
h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5
medical expenses (percentile) < 30th 30th   60th 60th   90th 90th   99th > 99th
Table 2: Health status and medical expenses
h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5
Medicaid: q ( 1; x) 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.52 0.50
Private insurance: q (i; x) for i = f0; 1; ::; 5g 0.00 0.40 0.71 0.78 0.81
Medicare: qmed (x) 0.00 0.35 0.56 0.64 0.65
Table 3: Fraction of medical expenses covered by insurance
Parameter name Notation Value Source
Risk aversion  3 -
Cobb-Douglas parameter  0.33 Capital share in output
Tax function parameters a0 0.258 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
a1 0.768 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Social Security replacement rates ss 45% -
Group insurance loads G 1.11 Kahn et all (2005)
Employer's contribution  0.83 Sommers (2002)
Medicare premium pmed $1,071 Total premiums =2.11% of Y
Table 4: Parameters set outside the model
Parameter name Notation Value Target
Discount factor  0.908 K
Y
= 3
Depreciation rate  0.07 r = 0:04
Individual Insurance loads I 1.21 % of individual insurance=8.2%
Medicaid's income eligibility ypub $4,595 % of public insurance=9.1%
Consumption oor c $8,807 % with assets<$5,000=20%
Table 5: Parameters used to match some targets
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uninsured public ins individual ins ESHI
data 21:45% 9:10% 8:20% 61:30%
model 25:4% 9:10% 8:20% 57:30%
Table 6: Percentage of non-elderly adults with dierent insurance status (2003/2004)
Baseline +GR contracts
Uninsured (%) 25.4 19.4
Individually insured (%) 8.2 14.2
- by standard contracts 8.2 4.4
- by GR contracts   9.8
Publicly insured (%) 9.1 9.1
Insured by ESHI (%) 57.3 57.3
Table 7: Insurance statistics before and after introduction of GR contracts (steady-state)
Insurance decisions if GR insurance is available
Uninsured Medicaid ESHI Std ins GR ins
Original decisions
Uninsured 80.7% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 19.26%
Medicaid 0.00% 100.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
ESHI 0.00% 0.00% 100.0% 0.00% 0.00%
Std ins 0.60% 0.00% 0.00% 54.63% 44.76%
Table 8: Changes in insurance decisions if GR contracts are available
Insurance Average E(x) Average labor inc Average total inc
Baseline Std ins 0.057 1.107 1.246
New steady-state Std ins 0.038 1.326 1.433
with GR ins GR ins 0.084 0.628 0.828
Table 9: Average income and medical expenses for people choosing dierent types of contracts
40
Experiments
average CEV
newborn all young
Benchmark 0.0170% 0.0696%
Eect of Medicaid and ESHI
- No Medicaid program 0.0171% 0.0715%
- No ESHI program 0.0537% 0.1774%
- No Medicaid and ESHI program 0.0542% 0.1812%
Eect of consumption oor
- 0:75c ($6,605) 0.0269% 0.1862%
- 0:50c ($4,403) 0.0571% 0.4134%
- 0:25c ($2,201) 0.2136% 1.0319%
- 0:10c ($880) 0.8575% 2.3293%
Eect of front-loading
- 125% of pGR 0.0151% 0.0645%
- 180% of pGR 0.0149% 0.0622%
Eect of labor income risk
- reduced labor income risk 0.0303% 0.0244%
Eect of actuarial unfairness
- No administrative load (GR = I = 0) 0.0150% 0.0905%
Table 10: Consumption equivalent variation after introducing GR contractsa
aThe above welfare changes are computed by comparing two economies: an economy with
a setup corresponding to each experiment and an economy with the same setup except having
guaranteed renewable contracts. The CEV of newborns corresponds to the comparative statics
between the two steady-states, while the CEV of all young takes into account the steady-state
distribution in the baseline model and the transition periods.
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uninsured Std ins GR ins Pub ins ESHI
Benchmark 19.4 4.4 9.8 9.1 57.3
No Medicaid 28.0 4.6 10.7   57.3
No ESHI 33.1 7.5 50.1 9.3  
0:75c ($6; 605) 12.0 6.2 17.4 6.6 57.8
0:50c ($4; 403) 7.3 5.9 24.2 4.2 58.3
0:25c ($2; 201) 3.3 4.7 30.9 2.9 58.2
0:10c ($880) 2.9 3.7 33.7 2.4 57.4
125% of pGR 18.9 4.6 10.1 9.1 57.3
180% of pGR 18.3 1.5 13.8 9.1 57.3
Reduced labor income risk 21.2 12.9 6.7 0.2 59.1
GR = I = 0 7.8 12.4 13.5 9.0 57.4
Table 11: Insurance statistics for model with GR contracts for dierent experiments (steady-state)
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Figure 1: Relationship between ESHI oer, labor income, and medical expenses
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Figure 2: Insurance decision by health status (baseline model)
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Figure 3: Insurance decision by labor income (baseline model)
44
1 2 3 4 50
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
health status
insurance premium (US$ in 2003)
 
 
STD ins
GR ins (Steady state)
Figure 4: Premiums for new contracts
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Figure 5: Average premiums for existing contracts
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Figure 6: Insurance decisions by health status in the steady-state (+GR contract)
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Figure 7: Insurance decisions by labor income in the steady-state (+GR contract)
46
1 2 3 4 50
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
income quintile
GR for asset quintile 5
1 2 3 4 50
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
income quintile
GR for asset quintile 4
1 2 3 4 50
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
income quintile
GR for asset quintile 2
1 2 3 4 50
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
income quintile
GR for asset quintile 1
Figure 8: Fraction of people buying GR contracts by income and asset quintile
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Figure 9: Consumption Equivalence by income and asset quintile (benchmark)
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Figure 10: Fraction of people buying GR contracts by income and asset quintile (eect of ESHI/MCD)
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Figure 11: Consumption Equivalence by income and asset quintile (eect of ESHI/MCD)
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Figure 12: Fraction of people buying GR contracts by income and asset quintile (eect of c)
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Figure 13: Consumption Equivalence by income and asset quintile (eect of c)
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Appendix
A Competitive equilibrium with asymmetric infor-
mation 31
Given the government programs

c; ss; qmed (x) ; pmed
	
; the insurance coverage fq (i; x)g,
and the fraction of the group premium contributed by the employer ( ), the compet-
itive equilibrium with asymmetric information consists of the set of equilibrium prices
w; r; p; pI (h) ; pGR (i)
	
, wage reduction fcEg, households' value functions fVy (s) ;Vo (s)g ;
decision rules for the young

c (s) ; k0 (s) ; iH (s)
	
and for the old fc (s) ; k0 (s)g ; the tax
function fT (y)g ; time-invariant distributions f y (s) ; o (s)g ; and the set of insurers'
beliefs ft+j (ht+jjht) ; j > 0;8tg such that the following conditions are satised:
1. Given the set of prices and the tax function, decision rules and value functions solve
the individuals' optimization problems (2) and (7).
2. Wage (w) and rent (r) satisfy Equations (15) and (16).
3. Labor market clears: L =
R
z y (s)
4. Capital market clears. Since guaranteed renewable contracts are front-loaded, there
will be a balance carrying over time for each contract. We need to take this balance
into account when computing the aggregate capital. Denote by tt+j(ht) an ex-post
balance at time t+j of a unit of contract sold at time t to an individual with health
status ht. One period after a contract is originated this balance takes the following
form:
tt+1 (ht) = p
GR (ht) (1 + r)  IEM (ht) +
pGR (ht)
Z
ht+1
F  ht+1; iHt+1 = RGRjjht; iHt = BGR
 y
 
ht; i
H
t = BGR
 :
31We refer to this equilibrium as asymmetric information equilibrium because insurance companies
observe only one state variable - health status. For guaranteed renewable contracts health is not the
only variable relevant for pricing which creates an asymmetric information environment.
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The rst term on the right-hand side is the premium collected at the initiation of
the contract and carried on to the next period. The second term is the cost of
medical claims in period t + 1. The last term is the revenue from the contract
renewal. We can dene recursively the ex-post balance j periods after the contract
is originated as follows32:
tt+j (ht) = 
t
t+j 1 (ht) (1 + r) 
I
Z
ht+j 1
EM (ht+j 1)
F  ht+j 1; iHt+j 1 = RGRjjht; iHt = BGR
 y
 
ht; i
H
t = BGR
 +
pGR (ht)
Z
ht+j
F
 
ht+j; i
H
t+j = RGRjjht; iHt = BGR

 y
 
ht; i
H
t = BGR
 :
Thus the capital market clearing condition in period t can be written as
K =
Z
k0 (s)  y (s) +
Z
k0 (s)  o (s)+
p
Z
1fiH(s)=BGg 
y (s) +
Z
1fiH(s)=BIgp
I (h)  y (s)+Z
1fiH(s)=BGRgp
GR (h)  y (s) +
1X
j=1
Z
t jt (ht j)  
y

ht j; i
H
t (s) = BGR

5. cE satises Equation (17) ; thus the rm oering ESHI earns zero prot.
6. The tax function fT (y)g satises the government budget balance in Equation (22).
7. Standard one-period insurance premiums, pI (h), satisfy Equation (18), guaranteed
renewable premiums pGR (i), i = 1; :::; H, satisfy Equation (19), and the group
insurance premium (p) satises Equation (21). Thus health insurance companies
earn zero expected prot on each contract.
8. Insurance companies' beliefs ft+j (ht+j;tjht) ; j > 0; 8tg satisfy Equation (20) if
32By recursively substituting tt+j 1, this equation is equivalent to Equation (19).
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 y

ht; i
H
t = BGR

6= 0. Otherwise,
t+j (ht+jjht) = 0 ; j > 0;8t: (24)
The last equation is the o-equilibrium belief of insurers. When no one with health
status ht buys a guaranteed renewable contract, insurers believe that if one with
health ht buys a guaranteed renewable contract, he will not renew the contract in
the next period33.
B Discussion of the assumption of exogenous medi-
cal expenses
Currently, two approaches exist for the modeling of medical expenses in macroeconomic
and structural studies. The rst approach takes a stand that medical expenses are ex-
ogenous shocks that result in monetary losses (see for example, Jeske and Kitao (2009),
Hansen et al (2012), French and Jones (2010), Kopecky and Koreshkova (2011)). The
second approach assumes that people can choose the amount of their medical spending
(Fonseca et al (2010), Ozkan (2011), Scholz and Seshadri (2010)). It is well know that
in reality medical spending has both discretionary and non-discretionary part. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge the literature lacks a model that can unite the two
approaches described above and reproduce the empirical patterns of discretionary vs.
non-discretionary spending.
Our choice of the model of exogenous medical spending is determined by the focus of
our study. We evaluate the value of dierent risk-sharing mechanisms available through
the current health insurance system in the U.S. As Rust and Phelan (1997) emphasize,
the value of health insurance to a large extent depends on the variance and skewness of
medical expenses. In addition, the value of health insurance depends on the correlation of
medical and labor income shocks. To adequately measure welfare eects of risk-sharing in
health insurance markets, we need to carefully represent the joint distribution of medical
33Our results are robust to an alternative specication of the o-equilibrium beliefs.
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expenses and labor income. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing models of
endogenous medical expenses can simultaneously reproduce the empirical variance and
skewness of medical spending and its correlation with labor income.
If we were able to incorporate adjustments in medical spending resulting from people's
optimal decision-making in our model, we can expect that better insurance options pro-
vided by guaranteed renewable contracts can improve health outcomes and consequently
increase our estimated welfare eects. However, we expect these eects to be small based
on the numerous empirical studies that suggest health insurance has little eect on sub-
sequent health outcomes. A seminal contribution in this area is RAND Health Insurance
Experiment, where a random set of individuals were given co-payment-free health insur-
ance over 3- to 5-year period, while a control group faced standard co-payments. Brook
et al (1983) found that the group with free health insurance had very similar health
outcomes than the control group, even though the former group had substantially higher
utilization rate of medical services. Several other studies nd similar results using dif-
ferent methods and data. Racine et al (2001) nd that expanded Medicaid eligibility
for children between 1989 and 1995 reduced uninsurance but had very limited eect on
health. Ross and Mirowsky (2000) using longitudinal data nd no dierence in health
status between privately insured and uninsured.
C Computational algorithm
We solved for the steady state equilibrium of the baseline model as follows.
1. Guess an initial interest rate r, price in the group insurance market p, the amount
the rm oering ESHI subtracts from the wage of their workers cE, prices of guaranteed
renewable contracts pGR(h); h = 1::H, and the tax parameter a2
34.
2. Guess value functions for young and old. Solve the problems for young and old. We
optimize with respect to savings and insurance decisions and evaluate the value function
for points outside the state space grid using a Piecewise Cubic Hermite Interpolating
34We cannot prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the health insurance market, however our
results are robust to alternative initial guesses of insurance prices (p and pGR(h); h = 1::H).
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Polynomial (PCHIP). Update the value functions and continue iterating until both value
functions converge. Use convergent value functions to nd policy functions.
3. Given the policy functions, simulate the households distribution using a non-
stochastic method as in Young (2010).
4. Use the distribution of households and policy functions to compute government
budget decit/surplus. Gradually update the tax function parameter a2, the interest
rate r, insurance prices pGR(h); h = 1::H, p, and the substraction from wage cE. Repeat
steps 2-3 until all these variables converge.
D Guaranteed renewable insurance market with fric-
tions
Our results show that if individuals gain access to a frictionless market oering guaranteed
renewable contracts this results in only small welfare gains.35 An alternative approach to
understand the value of guaranteed renewable insurance is to introduce these contracts in
the baseline economy and quantify the size of frictions needed to deter people from buying
them (the outcome observed in reality). In this section we take this second approach and
introduce frictions in the market for guaranteed renewable contracts as an extra cost
embedded in the premium. One can think of the extra cost arising from two sources.
First, to oer guaranteed renewable contracts, insurance companies need to commit to
the long-term contract and thus require a compensation for future uncertainties, which
are potentially large. The growth rate of aggregate medical expenses is dicult to predict,
particularly in the far future.36 In addition, the invention of new treatments, and changes
in clinical guidelines or standards can signicantly alter the dynamics of reclassication
35The premium for guaranteed renewable contract consists of two parts. First is the premium for the
regular one-period health insurance. We assume this premium is the same as in the market oering
standard one period contracts meaning it includes an administrative load. Second is the premium for
the right to renew the contract at the prespecied price. This part of the premium has no administrative
costs or any other loads. We refer to the guaranteed renewable market introduced in the benchmark
experiments of our paper as frictionless to stress the fact that the option to renew the contract is priced
actuarially fair.
36Cutler(1996) argues that the lack of long-term health insurance can be explained by the uncertainty
in aggregate medical costs.
54
risks, specically the transition probability of medical expenses in our model, which is the
basis for pricing guarantee renewable contracts. Second, guaranteed renewable contracts
are more complicated than regular insurance contracts, and consumers may need to put
more eorts to understand them.
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Figure 14: The dierence in premiums between frictionless guaranteed renewable contracts and guar-
anteed renewable contracts with an extra cost
To illustrate how large the extra cost that eliminates the demand for guaranteed re-
newable contracts should be, we use the following approach. We start with the benchmark
economy with frictionless guaranteed renewable contracts (as described in Section 6) and
gradually increase its premiums, pGR (h), till the take-up rate of each GR contract is less
than 0.25%.37 Figure (14) compares the premiums of guaranteed renewable contracts in
this experiment with the steady-state premiums reported in Section 6. The dierences
between the two premiums are $283, $276, $280, and $310 for the contract initiated by
a person in medical grid 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. In terms of the percentage dier-
ence, the premiums in the market with frictions are higher than frictionless premiums
by 17%, 12%, 8%, and 5% for people in medical grid 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Thus,
relatively small xed costs can eliminate demand for guaranteed renewable contracts,
which is consistent with our result that these contracts bring small welfare gains when
employers' sponsored health insurance and the minimum consumption guarantee coexist.
37Instead of completely eliminating the demand for guaranteed renewable contracts, we change the
premiums until the size of the market becomes very small. We do this to avoid the result when our
assumption about o-equilibrium beliefs inuences the equilibrium. One can argue that rms would
stop oering insurance contracts if there is too few participants in the market.
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It is worth noting that the additional costs needed to wipe out the demand for guarantee
renewable contracts need not to be large partly because of the adverse selection eect. A
small increase in premiums for guaranteed renewable contracts will repel people with low
probability to renew the contract in later periods. This increases the costs for insurers
to provide the option to renew the contract. Consequently, the premium increases which
decreases the demand of guaranteed renewable contracts even further.
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